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Abstract
Experimental economics techniques are used in this paper to examine the benefits and potential adoption of
Internet-based electronic auctions for the initial public offerings (IPO) market. The IPO market is dominated
by investment banks, which organize the promotion, pricing, and allocation of new securities. The high
transaction costs and inefficiency evident in the IPO market make it an apparent anomaly among modern
financial markets. Issuers pay high commissions, issues tend to be underpriced, and individual investors have
virtually no direct access to the market. Emerging Internet-based markets organized as electronic auctions
offer an alternative to traditional practices, and can potentially reduce costs and improve market quality. 
The auction and traditional intermediated market structures were replicated in a laboratory environment.
Subjects playing the role of investors and investment bankers participated in simulated IPO markets involving
various levels of risk and buying pressures similar to those expected in actual IPOs. The offer price and the
revenue to the market participants observed in the auction were compared to those collected in the
intermediated market. Results show that auction prices were greater than traditional intermediated market
prices when the value of the securities offered was more uncertain. As uncertainty decreased, auction prices
became comparable to intermediated market prices. Issuers received larger proceeds when going public
through the auction. Investors overall profits were positive in both market structures, although they were
significantly higher in the intermediated market.
1 INTRODUCTION 
The extensive use of information technology (IT) by organizations and individuals to conduct market transactions has generated
new forms of competition. Emerging electronic markets have developed innovative features to attract buyers and sellers interest.
While the transactions costs advantages of electronic markets have been well documented, less has been said on how these
markets should be designed. Research that offers market providers practical guidance on how to take advantage of IT to reshape
their trading institutions and address competitive threats will be particularly beneficial.  This paper examines how IT-enabled
changes in the distribution channels and pricing mechanisms for initial public offerings (IPO) may reshape the structure of the
primary market for financial equity. 
A recent example will illustrate how an alternative market system could lead to improved outcomes. On April 12, 2002, trading
of JetBlue Airways securities began for the first time ever on the NASDAQ National Market. The stock closed at $45. These
shares had been sold the day before to a small group of fortunate institutions and selected individuals at a unit price of $27. The
JetBlue IPO raised $148.5 million. The firm, however, only received $136 million after commissions and other expenses. While
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the IPO is considered a remarkable success among the financial community, several aspects are puzzling and worrisome and
illustrate apparent inefficiency and unfairness in the primary market for equities. Had the price of the stock been set at its eventual
market value, JetBlue would have raised $247.5 million, significantly more than its actual proceeds. On the investors side, a large
number were left out of the initial distribution, and felt they had missed out on a potential one-day return of 67 percent. 
The IPO market, the market for unseasoned equity offered for the first time by companies going public, is currently dominated
by large investment banks. Unlike secondary equity markets, often characterized by their efficiency and low frictional costs,
primary markets are plagued with high transaction costs. High commissions of 10 percent to 20 percent of the issues value and
an underpricing which averages between 10 percent and 15 percent (Barry and Jennings 1993) combine to raise a firms total costs
of going public to an average of 20 percent to 30 percent of the realized market value of the securities issued. In spite of these
inefficiencies, the market for IPOs is growing very rapidly: In 2001, about 422 United States and international companies went
public, raising a total of $97 billion, up from $63 billion in 2000. 
2 OLD AND NEW MARKET STRUCTURE
FOR INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS
A company seeking to issue new securities to the public traditionally hires the services of an investment bank, which conducts
due diligence, organizes the promotion of the issuing, sets the price, and allocates the new securities to investors who have
expressed interest in buying the stock.
Due diligence usually entails reviewing various facets of a company, such as its financial records, physical assets, and business
prospects. It aims at reducing information asymmetries between the issuing firm and the investors, and at allowing buyers to better
assess the risk-return tradeoffs of the transaction, while providing the investment bank with significant pricing information for
the new issue. The investment bank has strong incentives to perform the due diligence thoroughly, as it faces potential civil
liabilities and a loss of its reputation capital should the price of the securities in the after market drop below the initial offering
price.
After the IPO is completed, securities begin to trade on the secondary market at an equilibrium market price P*. Issuers receive
the offer price PIPO minus the underwriting discount and other expenses C1, which typically amount to between 10 percent and
20 percent of the proceeds. Individual investors, who do not have access to the primary market, pay P* on the secondary market.
Institutional investors buy the shares at PIPO, can resell them on the secondary market on the first day of trading at P*, and make
an average one day return of U/PIPO where U is the level of underpricing (U=P*-PIPO). The current structure of the IPO market
is summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1.   Current Structure of the IPO Market
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Figure 2.  Structure of the Electronic IPO Market
Key to the success of an IPO is the ability to reach the investors and to attract interest in the new offering. The firm going public
lacks direct access to investors and, hence, must rely on the investment banks distribution network to generate interest in the
company and attract capital. The availability of networking technologies such as the Internet has created opportunities for the
creation of new market forms. In particular, IPO markets can be developed that rely on electronic communication to bypass the
distribution channel of investment banks and directly link issuers and investors. This virtual marketplace allows sellers  (the
issuing firms) and buyers  (the investors) to expose their trading intentions and conduct exchange activities without the
intervention of an investment bank intermediary. In addition to being a virtual forum, electronic IPO markets can be organized
as electronic auctions, thereby providing pricing services. The structure of the electronic IPO is summarized in Figure 2.
In this electronic market structure, the services performed as a package by the investment bank have been unbundled. Pricing and
distribution are assumed by the electronic market, while the investment bank retains due-diligence and financial analysis services
critical to reducing information asymmetries between issuers and investors. The investment bank receives a fee C2 for these
services. Issuers receive the auction price PA minus C2, and the potential underpricing P*-PA accrues to both classes of investors.
3  PROBLEM STATEMENT
Innovative IT-based exchange institutions such as the electronic periodic auction are largely untested architectures. While a very
limited number of IPOs have been organized online, they have been received with skepticism by the marketplace. Their eventual
adoption is questionable, and it must be demonstrated that they do generate sufficient economic benefits and market quality
enhancements to gain and sustain trader interest in a competitive environment. 
To explore the relationship between the price setting mechanism and the incentives of the market participants, experimental
economics techniques were used. The auction and traditional intermediated market structures were replicated in a laboratory
environment. Subjects playing the role of investors and investment bankers participated in simulated IPOs involving various levels
of risk and buying pressures similar to those expected in actual IPOs. In their bidding and pricing decisions, investors and
investment bankers must consider not only their own preferences and expectations, but also how others actions affect the offer
price. Behavioral experiments are an effective technique to capture the implications of the gaming opportunities that arise in the
market participants decision-making process.
4  RESEARCH DESIGN
Two major factors affect the price of an IPO in the existing intermediated market: the uncertainty, or risk, associated with
information asymmetries and the future earning power of the issuing company, and the level of investor interest in the offering.
Offer price and uncertainty have been found to be negatively correlated. Investor interest, generated by the potential returns
associated with an attractively priced offering, is necessary for the full placement of the securities and subsequent trading on
secondary markets.
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Both factors should influence the price of an electronic auction. The level of investor interest translates into competitive pressures.
Higher buying pressures force investors to raise their strategic bid, and should result in higher auction prices (Belovicz 1979).
The degree of risk associated with the offering determines the reservation values on which strategic bids are based, and may also
affect the auction price.
As the electronic auction and the investment banker rely on fundamentally different price discovery mechanisms, and face
different incentive structures, the distribution channel should also significantly affect the offer price. Consequently, the three
variables that are manipulated in this research are the type of price setting institution, the level of risk associated with the offering,
and the degree of investor interest in the IPO.
4.1 Market Structure
The two market structures under study are the existing intermediated market and the electronic competitive auction. In the
experimental markets, a number N of securities will be offered for sale. These securities are all identical. They are valuable
because after they have been placed in the simulated IPO, a random draw from a uniform distribution determines their final value.
The currency used in the experiments is the Fantasy Franc (FF), which is ultimately converted into real dollars.
In the intermediated market, investment bankers compete for the issuers business. This price competition between underwriters
is consistent with the fact that investment bankers lose market share if they misprice the offering (Beatty and Ritter 1986). The
winning underwriter subsequently sells the securities at a publicized offer price to a population of investors. This placement period
of the IPO is organized as a posted offer price market:  investors observe the price, the distribution of resale values, and decide
on the quantity of securities they want to buy. 
In the experimental competitive auction, investment bankers do not participate. The population of investors is invited to submit
bids for the securities offered for sale. Investors know the number of shares available in the IPO, as well as the distribution of
resale values of the securities. The offer price is determined by the lowest accepted bid, and all the securities are sold at that price.
The profit of the investors is the difference between the random final value and the offer price. The profit of the investment
bankers is a function of their ability to get the issuers business, generate investor interest in the offering, and the resale value of
the securities. The asymmetric nature of the investment bankers payoff (Tinic 1988) is replicated in this experimental
environment.
4.2 Riskiness of the Security
The securities sold in the experimental market are risky because they have an unknown resale value. The degree of uncertainty
associated with the securities is determined by the width of the uniform distribution from which the resale value of the security
is drawn. Riskier securities translate into riskier IPOs. The resale value can be interpreted as the secondary market price for the
securities: after they acquire shares in the IPO, investors can resell them as soon as they become publicly traded. This treatment
of risk is consistent with the way scholars have examined the relationship between price and uncertainty (Kagel 1995).
Three treatments of risk are used here:
 Low risk:  The range of the rectangular distribution is [FF9.00, FF11.00]. 
 Medium risk:  The range of the rectangular distribution is [FF7.00, FF13.00]. 
 High risk:  The range of the rectangular distribution is [FF5.00, FF15.00].
The expected value of the security is always FF10.00.
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Distribution Uncertainty Scarcity
Channel Large Medium Small
Intermediated Low 18 offerings 18 offerings 18 offerings
Market Medium 18 offerings 18 offerings 18 offerings
High 18 offerings 18 offerings 18 offerings
Competitive Low 18 offerings 18 offerings 18 offerings
Auction Medium 18 offerings 18 offerings 18 offerings
High 18 offerings 18 offerings 18 offerings
4.3 Scarcity
Scarcity is a proxy for the degree of investors interest in the offering. Scarcity is implemented as the difference between the
number of allowable single-unit bids or orders and the number of shares for sale. For example, if the maximum number of bids
is 24 and there are 14 shares for sale, the scarcity is 10, which means that 10 bids will not be honored. 
Scarcity has been frequently used to proxy competitive pressures in experimental auction markets (Miller and Plott 1985). Scarcity
appears as (N  M) in the optimal bid function derived by McCabe et al. (1990), which predicts the single price for an auction
with N bidders and M units for sale to be:
(4.1) N1,....,ifor              )( 
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where Vl is the lowest individual valuation assigned to the security, VM is the individual valuation of the Mth
bidder, N is the number of competing bids, and M is the number of units offered for sale.
Thus, in the electronic auction, higher levels of scarcity should result in more aggressive bidding and higher auction prices. Note
that the issuer cannot manipulate the level of scarcity as the number of shares issued is subject to approval by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and is announced in the prospectus.
In the intermediated market, scarcity proxies the selling effort required by the investment banker to place the securities. As
scarcity increases, so does the ratio of potential buyers to the number of securities offered, making it easier for the investment
banker to place the totality of the offering. 
Three treatments of scarcity are used here:
 Low scarcity:   The level of low scarcity is set at 10. In this experimental design, with 12 investors allowed 2 bids or orders
each, a scarcity of 10 results in 14 shares offered in the IPO. Low scarcity corresponds to low competitive pressures. 
 Medium scarcity:  The level of medium scarcity is 14: there are 10 shares offered. 
 High scarcity:  The level of high scarcity is set at 18: there are 6 shares offered. High scarcity corresponds to high competitive
pressures.
The resulting experimental design is the two by three by three design summarized in Table 1.
Table 1.   2 x 3 x 3 Factorial Research Design
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5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The incentive structure inherent to the intermediated nature of the primary market results in systematic underpricing. This payoff
structure is asymmetric: the losses involved in a failed IPO can be significantly larger than the profits generated by a successful
issuing and banks tend to act conservatively in their pricing decisions to minimize their downside risk (Tinic 1988). This
asymmetric payoff is a structural attribute that cannot be altered without fundamentally changing the underlying market structure.
It is replicated in the experimental intermediated market, and is expected to generate some level of underpricing. Based on
empirical observation of one-day returns for unseasoned securities, the underpricing ranged from 4.8 percent to as much as 18.8
percent, depending on the period over which these numbers were measured and the method used to compute the price appreciation
(Beatty and Ritter 1986, Tinic 1988).
In the competitive auction environment, investors bid for the securities. Auction theory predicts that investors will discount their
private valuation of the commodity to account for both competitive pressures and the uncertainty associated with the value of the
security. Assuming risk neutral investors, the theoretical auction price in the experiments should be as low as FF9.55  (a 4.76
percent underpricing) in the risk high, low scarcity conditions, rising to FF9.95 (a 0.53 percent underpricing) when risk is low
and scarcity is high. These theoretical levels of underpricing are significantly lower than the level of underpricing observed on
the actual intermediated primary market. Hence,
 
Hypothesis 1:  The price will be higher in the competitive auction than in the intermediated market, under each
of the nine experimental market conditions. 
Risk negatively affects theoretical auction prices through lower individual valuations and strategic bids. Assuming risk neutral
investors, the theoretical auction price rises from FF9.55 to FF9.91 (4.76 percent to 0.92 percent underpricing) when risks goes
from high to low in low scarcity conditions. Risk also negatively affects the price in the intermediated market. Ex ante uncertainty
was found to correlate positively with underpricing (Ibbotson and Ritter 1995), with the difference between the underpricing level
of risky and non-risky issuers being as large as 10 percent, primarily because of the asymmetric nature of the payoff structure.
While both institutions are sensitive to risk, the intermediated market prices appear to be more negatively affected by uncertainty
than auction prices. Hence,
Hypothesis 2:  The higher the uncertainty about the resale value of the security, the lower the issue price in both
market structures, with a stronger negative impact on prices in the intermediated market than in the competitive
auction.
As scarcity increases, the lower supply of securities should result in higher prices in both markets. In addition, higher levels of
scarcity reduce the factor by which bidders discount their reservation values in their strategic bid. Thus, the price increase resulting
from higher scarcity is amplified in the auction by the bidders strategic response to increased competitive pressures. Hence,
Hypothesis 3:  The more intense the competitive pressures, the higher the price, in both market structures, with
a stronger positive effect on prices in the competitive auction than in the intermediated market.
 Hypotheses 2 and 3 express the fact that risk and scarcity affect the price in both market environments, and that the intermediated
market is more sensitive to conditions of risk, while the auction is more sensitive to the intensity of buying pressures.
6 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Each experiment consisted of a series of 27 independent trading periods. In each period, 12 investors competed to acquire a
fictitious security. In addition to the 12 investors, the experimental intermediated market featured three investment bankers
competing for the right to underwrite the IPO. The objective of each subject was to maximize trading gains that were paid in cash
at the end of the experiment. This remuneration structure is essential to ensure that subjects do not treat the experiments as a game,
but instead act as a real economic agents under the rules specified in the simulated market.
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Condition Revenue Penalty
Investment bank loses the
underwritng contract
N/A FF 0.20
Investment bank wins the
underwriting contract
FF 2.00 N/A
Resale value > Offer price (Resale value − Offer
price) * 0.5
N/A
Resale value < Offer Price
N/A
(Offer price − Resale value) * 0.5
p(law suit) = Offer price  0.9 *  Resale value
Resale value
 −
Damages = 3 + (bid price − resale
value)*4
Number of orders <
Quantity for sale
N/A Quantity for sale − Number of orders
6.1 Subjects
Subjects were undergraduate students from the Zicklin School of Business. They had no prior trading experience, and were all
between 18 and 22 years old. Subjects were allowed to participate only once in the experiments, with the exception of the
investment banker subjects who were required to have participated as investor subjects in a previous auction experiment. 
6.2 Experimental Procedures for the Competitive Auction
In the competitive auction environment, a single price was set for the fixed quantity N of the security offered for sale. Each subject
had to submit two bids above the minimum acceptable bid. Each bid was for a single security. The N highest bids were accepted.
The auction price was set at the lowest accepted bid. After the auction price had been determined, the resale value of the securities
was drawn, and the profit determined.
6.3 Experimental Procedures for the Intermediated Market
In the intermediated market, a small group of three experienced subjects acted as investment bankers. Experience here refers to
previous participation as an investor in an auction experiment. The role of these investment bankers was to set the offer price for
the N securities in the IPO. These N securities were then offered to 12 investors at the price set by the investment banker. Investors
had to decide whether to buy 0, 1, or 2 securities at that offer price. After the resale value was drawn, the profit of the investors
was computed as in the auction.
Three investment bankers competed for the right to underwrite the issue. They had to submit a bid representing the price at which
they were going to resell the issue to the investors. The winning investment banker was rewarded FF 2.00 for his underwriting
efforts, and the losing investment bankers were penalized FF 0.20 for their cost of bidding for the offering. The winning
investment banker received a bonus if the resale value of the securities was above the offer price, but was penalized and faced
the risk of legal costs otherwise. The probability of a lawsuit and the damages were proportional to the difference between the
offer price and the resale value. In addition, the investment banker is penalized FF 1.00 for each unsold security. The incentive
structure for the investment banker is outlined in Table 2.
While this payoff structure is arbitrary, it captures the asymmetric reward structure typical of actual underwritten IPOs, and should
reflect the sensitivity of the pricing decisions to risk and scarcity. In their bidding decision, investment bankers must balance the
risk of losing the contract by bidding too low, with their exposure to legal damages and the risk of insufficient demand if the offer
price is too high. 
Table 2.  The Investment Bankers Payoff Structure in the Intermediated Market
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Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk
Auction Int. Mkt. Auction Int. Mkt. Auction Int. Mkt.
Low Scarcity - Quantity Available = 14
Mean 9.49*** 9.47*** 9.35*** 9.31*** 9.28*** 8.61***
Variance 0.145 0.050 0.219 0.0100 0.895 0.121
Standard Deviation 0.380 0.224 0.468 0.100 0.946 0.348
Number of Observations n = 18 n = 18 n = 18
F test for equal Variance F = 2.870 F = 21.98 F = 7.392
p = 0.018 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
F test for equal Mean F = 0.026 F = 0.155 F = 7.875
(one tailed) p = 0.437 p = 0.349 p = 0.005
Power (α = 0.05) 7.7% 13.7% 99.0%
Medium Scarcity - Quantity Available = 10
Mean 9.84*** 9.87** 9.88* 9.73** 9.67* 9.07***
Variance 0.025 0.055 0.148 0.223 0.768 0.315
Standard Deviation 0.158 0.235 0.384 0.473 0.876 0.562
Number of Observations n = 18 n = 18 n = 18
F test for equal Variance F = 2.214 F = 1.511 F = 2.136
p = 0.055 p = 0.201 p = 0.067
F test for equal Mean F = 0.111 F = 1.092 F = 5.980
(one tailed) p = 0.371 p = 0.152 p = 0.010
Power (α = 0.05) 1.7% 43.2% 96.5%
High Scarcity - Quantity Available = 6
Mean 10.36*** 10.27*** 10.39** 9.89 10.41* 9.19***
Variance 0.057 0.030 0.366 0.189 0.726 0.925
Standard Deviation 0.238 0.174 0.605 0.435 0.852 0.962
Number of Observations n = 18 n = 18 n = 18
F test for equal Variance F = 1.865 F = 1.932 F = 1.273
p = 0.104 p = 0.092 p = 0.312
F test for equal Mean F = 1.635 F = 8.108 F = 15.98
(one tailed) p = 0.105 p = 0.004 p = 0.000
Power (α = 0.05) 56.3% 99.1% 100.0%
*     Significant at p=0.05 **   Significant at p=0.01 *** Significant at p=0.001
7 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
7.1 Test of Hypothesis 1
Differences between auction and intermediated market prices were tested under the null hypothesis using the F statistic, adjusted
for unequal sample variance when necessary. Results are presented in Table 3.  The asterisks by the means indicate statistically
significant departures from the average resale value of FF10.0.
Experimental results show partial support for Hypothesis 1:  in only four of the nine market environments were price differences
statistically significant in the hypothesized direction. Prices in both market structures were similar in low risk conditions,
independent of the level of scarcity. As risk increased, so did the gap between prices in the two market structures. In medium and
high risk conditions, auction prices were higher than investment banker prices, but the difference was statistically significant in
high risk conditions only.
Table 3.  Prices and Variances Observed in the Auction and Intermediated Market
(Shaded cells indicate statistically significant departures from the null hypothesis.)
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Low to Medium Risk Medium to High Risk
Auction Int. Mkt. Auction Int. Mkt.
Low Scarcity - Quantity Available = 14
Mean -0.14 -0.17 -0.07 -0.69
Standard Deviation 0.620 0.230 1.036 0.365
Number of Observations n = 18 n = 18
F test for equal Mean F = 0.032 F = 5.778
(one tailed) p = 0.430 p = 0.013
Medium Scarcity - Quantity Available = 10
Mean 0.03 -0.14 -0.21 -0.66
Standard Deviation 0.351 0.591 0.694 0.766
Number of Observations n = 18 n = 18
F test for equal Mean F = 1.128 F = 3.416
(one tailed) p = 0.149 p = 0.037
High Scarcity - Quantity Available = 6
Mean 0.03 -0.38 0.02 -0.70
Standard Deviation 0.632 0.519 0.616 0.771
Number of Observations n = 18 n = 18
F test for equal Mean F = 4.544 F = 9.347
(one tailed) p = 0.040 p = 0.002
Two other interesting results emerge from the data in Table 3.  First, there was significant underpricing in the intermediated
market in all but two market conditions, while auction prices exhibited a pattern of underpricing in low scarcity conditions and
overpricing in high scarcity environments. Second, price variance in the intermediated market was small in the low scarcity
environment, increasing moderately with both risk and scarcity. Price variance in the auction rose at extreme levels of scarcity,
while also increasing with risk.
7.2 Test of Hypothesis 2
The first part of Hypothesis 2 asserts that in both market structures, all other factors being held equal, prices should decrease as
uncertainty about the resale value of the securities increases. Results reported in Table 3 show partial support for Hypothesis 2:
prices decreased with risk in the intermediated environment, as well as in the auction under conditions of low and medium
scarcity. Auction prices rose with risk, however, in high scarcity environments. 
The analysis of variance and the F statistic were used to test for pairwise differences between prices in adjacent conditions of risk.
In the intermediated environment, for each level of scarcity, average prices were always statistically significantly lower (p = 0.05)
in the higher risk environment, in support for Hypothesis 2. Average auction prices, however, adjusted to increasing uncertainty
following a singular pattern of decreasing prices in low scarcity conditions, and rising prices in high scarcity markets, in sharp
contrast with the predictions of Hypothesis 2. While this price behavior in the auction was explained by heterogeneous bidding
behavior in the subject population, the price variations induced by changing uncertainty remained small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
The second part of Hypothesis 2 contrasts the magnitude of price changes in response to risk in both market structures, stating
that intermediated market prices will adjust downward faster to account for riskier environments. Differences in risk induced price
changes between both market structures were tested under the null hypothesis using the F statistic. The results are reported in
Table 4.
Table 4.  Amplitude of Risk-Related Price Adjustments in Auction and Intermediated Markets
(Shaded cells indicate statistically significant departures from the null hypothesis.)
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Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk
Auction Int. Mkt. Auction Int. Mkt. Auction Int. Mkt.
Low to Medium Scarcity
Mean 0.36 0.39 0.53 0.42 0.39 0.46
Standard Deviation 0.313 0.271 0.561 0.467 0.793 0.563
Number of Observations n = 18 n = 18 n = 18
F test for equal Mean F = 0.159 F = 0.376 F = 0.085
(one tailed) p = 0.346 p = 0.272 p = 0.386
Medium to High Scarcity
Mean 0.52 0.41 0.51 0.16 0.74 0.13
Standard Deviation 0.266 0.183 0.497 0.625 0.842 0.726
Number of Observations n = 18 n = 18 n = 18
F test for equal Mean F = 2.129 F = 3.458 F = 5.442
(one tailed) p = 0.077 p = 0.036 p = 0.013
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the price decline associated with increasing uncertainty was always larger in the intermediated
market, with the difference being significant in the medium to high-risk  transitions, and in the high scarcity environment. In the
low and medium scarcity environments, the importance of demand in the price setting decision of the investment banker must
have dominated the impact of rising risk. The resulting smaller price variations were comparable to the price adjustments observed
in the demand driven auction.
Overall, support for Hypothesis 2 was mixed. Prices declined with risk in the intermediated market, but rose with uncertainty in
high scarcity auctions. And while the impact of risk was more significant on prices in the intermediated market than in the auction,
the magnitude of the impact of risk on auction prices appears to be a function of the level of scarcity. 
7.3 Test of Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 states that prices should rise with scarcity in both the auction and the intermediated market, and that the increase
will be larger in the auction. Evidence of prices rising with competitive pressures was presented in Table 3.  The analysis of
variance and the F statistic were used to test for pair-wise differences between prices in adjacent conditions of scarcity. In both
institutions, for each level of risk, average prices were significantly higher (p = 0.05) when competitive pressures were the most
intense.
The second part of Hypothesis 3 asserts that the auction will be more sensitive to changing scarcity conditions than the
intermediated market. The F statistic was used to compare the magnitude of the price variation resulting from changes in
competitive pressures in each pricing institution. The results are presented in Table 5.  Mean values in low to medium and in
medium to high scarcity cells were computed as the difference between the price in medium scarcity and the price in low scarcity
conditions, and the difference between the price in high scarcity and the price in medium scarcity conditions respectively.
There was little support for the second part of Hypothesis 3. Only when scarcity was increased from medium to high in medium
and high risk conditions was the magnitude of price adjustments significantly larger in the auction than in the intermediated
market. In medium and high risk  environments, the investment banker sets the price to reduce the potential cost and likelihood
of legal proceedings. While, in high scarcity condition, higher prices would still generate sufficient demand to place all the
securities, they would also unduly expose investment banks to legal liabilities. Thus, risk becomes the dominant factor in the
investment bankers pricing decision. The price is set to keep the expected costs of legal action low, and less constraining demand
conditions are unlikely to raise the price level.
Table 5.  Magnitude of Price Changes Resulting from Increasing Scarcity from
Low to Medium, and from Medium to High
(Shaded cells indicate statistically significant departures from the null hypothesis.)
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n = 162 Auction Intermediated
Market
α 8.953 9.747
t value 52.463*** 73.019***
β1 (Risk) -0.057 -0.456
t value -0.990 10.067***
β2 (Scarcity) 0.506 0.328
t value 8.737*** 7.229***
*** Significant at p=0.001
Prices in both market structures were sensitive to risk and scarcity.  Risk-induced changes in demand conditions affected the price
in both the auction and the intermediated market, and the legal framework in the intermediated market, which protects investors
against a severe post-offering price decline, accentuated the impact of risk on the investment bankers price. The negatively sloped
demand curves turned the scarcity factor into a major price determinant. Given the fixed number of investors in the experiments,
lower quantities of securities available in the IPO resulted in higher offer prices. 
The relative importance of the two environmental factors, risk and scarcity, was tested on price in the laboratory environment by
estimating the following regression:
Pricet = a  +  b1 Riskt    +  b2 Scarcityt   +  ei
using categorical variables for risk and scarcity. The estimated regression coefficients for each institution are presented in Table 6.
As expected, both risk and scarcity are significantly affecting the price level in the intermediated market. The large coefficient
for the risk factor reflects the highly depressing effect of uncertainty on the investment bankers price. The interaction term
Risk*Scarcity was introduced to account for the fact that the positive impact of scarcity was less significant in higher risk
conditions, but this factor was not significant and was dropped from the regression.
Table 6.  Regression Equation Coefficients
8 DISCUSSION
Investment banks have traditionally provided the primary market for equities. The evidence presented in this research suggests
that they may face competition from a new class of institutions relying on electronic auctions to price and distribute unseasoned
securities. In the laboratory environment, prices in the auction were always competitive, and often higher than the prices set by
the investment banker, while allowing investors to earn a positive profit on their investing activities.
The sensitivity of the offer price to market conditions has multiple implications. First, the issuer with a risky offering should favor
the auction to price and distribute the unseasoned securities. Providing that sufficient interest can be generated around the offering,
the issuer will get higher proceeds in the auction. Conversely, the low risk issuer should seek the investment bankers services.
The investment bankers knowledge and privileged access to the investing community guarantee that there will be some interest
for the offering. Lower price variance and the possibility of an underwriting agreement to secure proceeds are additional incentives
in favor of the intermediated market. Thus, the competition between the two market structures could operate as a separating
mechanism, directing high-risk  issuers to the auction, and low-risk ones to the investment banker. In this case, the choice of the
distribution channel by the issuer could act as a signaling device, revealing the level of uncertainty associated with the issuing
companys prospects. 
Second, the auction will operate best when competitive pressures surrounding the offering are kept at an average level. In the
experiments, medium scarcity reduced price variance, and minimized the impact of risk on the auction price. Finally, investment
bankers can compete effectively with the auction for low risk issuers, but are at a severe disadvantage with more risky offerings.
If investment banks focus their underwriting activities on low risk issuers, the separating mechanism will operate effectively, and
issuers may maximize proceeds from their IPOs by selecting the distribution channel that best fits the expected riskiness of their
securities.
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